The cost of Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT) storage is the main concern preventing its adoption in practice. This cost stems from the need to maintain at least 3t + 1 replicas in different storage servers in the asynchronous model, so that t Byzantine replica faults can be tolerated. In this paper we show a fundamental separation of data from metadata for BFT storage, which allows us to develop a novel BFT storage protocol that reduces the number of data replicas to as few as 2t + 1, maintaining 3t + 1 replicas of metadata at (possibly) different servers. We also show that this is optimal, i.e., that 2t + 1 data replicas are needed even for crash-tolerant storage that uses a fault-free metadata service oracle. We show also that separating data from metadata for reducing the cost of BFT storage is not possible without cryptographic assumptions. However, our protocol uses only lightweight cryptographic hash functions.
Introduction
Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT) protocols are notoriously costly to deploy. This cost stems from the fact that, in many applications, tolerating Byzantine faults requires more resources than tolerating less severe faults, such as crashes. For example, in the asynchronous communication model, BFT read/write storage [19] protocols are shown to require at least 3t + 1 replicas in different storage servers so that t Byzantine server faults can be tolerated [26] . This is to be contrasted with the requirement for 2t + 1 replicas in the asynchronous crash model for protocols used in production cloud-storage systems. This gap between crash tolerance and BFT is one of the main concerns for practical adoption of BFT systems.
In this paper we show that, perhaps surprisingly, this gap may in fact be significantly smaller. Namely, we show a fundamental separation of data from metadata for BFT storage which we use to design MDStore, a novel protocol that reduces the number of data replicas to as few as 2t + 1, maintaining 3t M + 1 metadata replicas at (possibly) different servers. Here, t and t M are thresholds on the number of Byzantine data and metadata replicas, respectively. To achieve lower replication cost, MDStore does not sacrifice other functionalities. Namely, MDStore implements multi-writer multi-reader (MWMR) atomic [19] wait-free [15] storage that tolerates any number of Byzantine readers and crash-faulty writers. MDStore is the first asynchronous BFT storage protocol that does not assume any trusted components to reduce its resource cost (unlike [7, 8, 18, 28] ). Moreover, being a fully asynchronous read/write storage protocol, MDStore is fundamentally different from the existing consensus and state-machine replication protocols that employ similar separation of control and data planes [14, 21, 31] , which are subject to the FLP impossibility result [11] and require partial synchrony [9] .
The key technique that allows MDStore to achieve lower replication cost, is separation of data from metadata, where metadata holds: (i) a hash of a value, (ii) a timestamp, and (iii) pointers to data servers that store a value. MDStore has modular architecture: a client reads and writes metadata through an abstraction of a metadata service: an array of SWMR safe wait-free storage objects [19] and a novel MWMR atomic waitfree storage object variant, we call timestamped storage. This object is very similar to classical atomic [19] (or linearizable [17] ) storage, except that it exposes a timestamp of stored values to clients as well. In an array of safe storage, indexed by timestamps, MDStore stores hashes of data values, whereas in atomic timestamped storage, MDStore stores pointers to t + 1 (out of 2t + 1) data replicas storing the most recent value. On the other hand, data replicas simply store timestamp/value pairs. Finally, we show that the MDStore metadata service can be implemented from simple asynchronous BFT SWMR safe [1, 13, 24] and SWMR atomic [2, 12, 14, 25] storage protocols using 3t + 1 replicas for tolerating t faults; in the context of MDStore, these replicas are exactly the 3t M + 1 metadata replicas.
We further prove that at least 2t + 1 data replicas are necessary for implementations that leverage a metadata service, even if data replicas can fail only by crashing. This shows not only that MDStore is optimally resilient, but also that it incurs no additional data replication cost compared to crash-tolerant storage. Our 2t + 1 lower bound has a very broad scope: it applies to any obstruction-free [16] singlewriter single-reader safe 1 storage [19] . Moreover, for the purpose of the lower bound, we define a metadata service very loosely as a fault-free oracle, that can implement arbitrary functionality with a single limitation: roughly speaking, metadata service can not be used for storing and/or forwarding data. We believe that this definition of a metadata service is of an independent interest.
Finally, we show that separating data from metadata for reducing the cost of BFT storage is not possible without limiting the power of the Byzantine adversary. Namely, for an unrestricted, unbounded Byzantine adversary, we show that our lower bound on the number of data replicas extends to 3t + 1, despite the metadata service oracle. However, this 3t + 1 lower bound does not apply to a practically relevant, bounded adversary that cannot subvert collision-resistance of cryptographic hash functions. Intuitively, this explains why our MDStore protocol stores value hashes in its metadata service.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we give system model and preliminary definitions. In Section 3 we present MDStore. In Section 4 we prove our lower bounds on the number of data replicas. Section 5 discusses related work. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper and discusses future work. For lack of space, the correctness proof of MDStore is postponed to Appendix A.
System Model and Definitions
Processes. The distributed system we consider consists of four sets of processes: (1) a set metadata replicas of size M containing processes {m 1 , ..., m M }, (2) data replicas of size D containing processes {d 1 , ..., d D }, (3) a set writers of size W containing processes {w 1 , ..., w W }; and (4) a set readers of size R containing processes {r 1 , ..., r R }. The set clients is the union of the sets writer and readers. Similarly, the set replicas is the union of the sets data replicas and metadata replicas. Clients are disjoint from replicas, bur sets writers and readers can intersect, just like sets metadata replicas and data replicas.
We model distributed algorithm A as a collection of deterministic automata, where A p is the automata assigned to process p. Computation of benign processes proceeds in steps of A. For space constraints, we omit the full details of this model and refer the reader to [23] . Channels. We assume that every process can communicate with every other process using point-to-point perfect asynchronous communication channels [4] . In short, perfect channels guarantee reliable communication: i.e., if neither process at the end of a communication channel is faulty, every sent message is eventually delivered to the receiver exactly once. 2 For presentation simplicity, we also assume a global clock, which, however, is not accessible to processes who perform local computations and communicate asynchronously. Adversary. A Byzantine process p does not need to follow A p and can perform arbitrary actions: (1) it can send arbitrary messages and (2) it can change its state in an arbitrary manner. We assume an adversary that can coordinate Byzantine processes and make them collude. However, unless explicitly specified differently, we assume a bounded adversary that cannot break cryptographic hash functions. Otherwise, we speak of an unbounded adversary.
Here we use a deterministic model for a cryptographic hash function. A hash function maps a bit string of arbitrary length to a short, unique representation of fixed length and is implemented by a functionality (or a distributed oracle) accessible to all processes. The functionality provides only a single operation H; its invocation takes a bit string x as parameter and returns an integer as the response. The implementation maintains a list L of all x that have been queried so far. When the invocation contains x ∈ L, then H responds with the index of x in L; otherwise, H adds x to L at the end and returns its index. This ideal implementation models only collision resistance, i.e., that it is infeasible even for an unbounded adversary to produce two different inputs x and x such that H(x) = H(x ). When considering a computationally bounded adversary, one may also use the traditional cryptographic formalization of hash functions [27] Finally we assume that channels that relate benign processes are authenticated, i.e., that the adversary cannot (undetectably) insert messages in these channels. Authenticated communication can be implemented easily from point-to-point links with a message-authentication code (MAC) [27] , a symmetric cryptographic primitive that relies on a secret key shared by every pair of processes. We assume that these keys have been distributed by a trusted entity beforehand.
Executions and Faults. Given any algorithm A, a execution of A is an infinite sequence of steps of A taken by benign processes, and actions of Byzantine processes. A partial execution is a finite prefix of some execution. An (partial) execution ex extends some partial execution ex if ex is a prefix of ex . We say that a benign process p is correct in an execution ex if p takes an infinite number of steps of A in ex. Otherwise a benign process p is crash-faulty. We say that a crash-faulty process p crashes at step sp in an execution, if sp is the last step of p in that execution.
In our model, in any execution, writers are benign and any number of them can be crash-faulty. Moreover, any number of readers can be Byzantine. Unless stated differently, we assume that up to t (resp., t M ) data (resp., metadata) replicas can be Byzantine; other replicas are correct. Unless stated differently, we assume D = 2t + 1 data replicas and M = 3t M + 1 metadata replicas. Storage object. A storage abstraction is a shared READ/WRITE object. It sequential specification consists of a shared variable x with two operations: WRITE(v), which takes a value v from domain V , stores v in x and returns special value ok / ∈ V , and READ(), which returns the value from x. We assume that the initial value of x is a special value ⊥ / ∈ V . We assume that each client invokes at most one operation at a time (i.e., does not invoke the next operation until it receives the response for the current operation). Only writers invoke WRITE operations, whereas any client can invoke READ operations. We sometimes talk about single writer single reader (SWSR) storage, where we assume two distinct clients: namely the writer and the distinct reader process. Otherwise we assume multiple writers and readers (W, R > 1).
For presentation simplicity, we do not explicitly model the initial state of processes, nor the invocations and responses of the operations of the storage to be implemented. We assume that the algorithm A initializes the processes in executions, and schedules invocation/response of operations (i.e., A modifies the states of the processes accordingly). However, we say that p invokes op at step sp, if A modifies the state of a process p in step sp so as to invoke an operation (and similarly for a response).
We say that a READ/WRITE operation op is complete in a (partial) execution if the execution contains a response step for op. In any run, we say that a complete operation op1 precedes operation op2 (or op2 follows op1) if the response step of op1 precedes the invocation step of op2 in that run. If neither op1 nor op2 precedes the other, the operations are said to be concurrent. Timestamped Storage. We also consider a special storage variant called timestamped storage with a slightly different sequential specification. Besides x (initialized to ⊥), timestamped storage maintains a timestamp T S (an integer, initially 0). Timestamped storage exports the following operations:
• TSWRITE((ts, v)) takes a pair of an integer timestamp ts and a value v ∈ V ; if ts ≥ T S, then 3 it stores ts to T S and v to x atomically. Regardless of timestamp ts, TSWRITE returns ok.
• TSREAD() returns the pair (T S, x).
Safety and Liveness. An algorithm implements safe ( resp., atomic) storage if every (partial) execution of the algorithm satisfies safety ( resp., atomicity) properties [19] .We define safety in the single writer setting. We say that a partial execution satisfies safety if every READ operation rd that is not concurrent with any WRITE operation returns value v written by the last WRITE that precedes rd, or ⊥ in case there is no such a WRITE. An execution ex satisfies atomicity (or linearizability [17] ) if ex can be extended (by appending zero or more response events) to an execution ex and there is a sequential permutation π of ex (without incomplete invocations) such that π preserves the real-time precedence order of operations in ex and satisfies the sequential specification. Moreover, a storage algorithm is obstruction-free (resp., wait-free) if every execution satisfies obstruction-freedom [16] (resp., wait-freedom [15] ). Obstruction-freedom states that if a correct client invokes operation op and no other client takes steps, op eventually completes. Wait-freedom states that if a correct client invokes operation op, op eventually completes. Finally, atomicity and wait-freedom also apply to timestamped storage.
MDStore Protocol
In this section, we first briefly overview MDStore and then explain its modular pseudocode. We then discuss possible implementations of the MDStore metadata service module using existing BFT storage protocols. For lack of space, a full correctness proof is postponed to Appendix A.
Overview
MDStore is a multi-writer multi-reader (MWMR) atomic wait-free BFT storage protocol that uses 2t + 1 data replicas and 3t M + 1 metadata replicas. Our implementation of MDStore is modular. Namely, metadata replicas are hidden within a metadata service module M DS which consists of: (a) one MWMR atomic wait-free timestamped storage object (denoted by M DS dir ) which stores the metadata about the latest authoritative storage timestamp ts and acts as a directory by pointing to a set of t + 1 data replicas that store the value associated with the latest timestamp (in the vein of [10] ); and (b) an array of SWMR safe wait-free storage objects (denoted by M DS hash ), each storing a hash of a value associated with a given timestamp ts, where timestamps are used as indices of the M DS hash array. While M DS dir can be written by any writer and read by any client, each of the storage objects is written by a single writer (and read by readers) in a write-once manner. MDStore timestamps are classical multi-writer timestamps comprised of an integer and writers' id which are used as tiebreakers.
MDStore client pseudocode is given in Algorithm 1 with data replica pseudocode given in Algorithm 2. On a high level, WRITE(v) proceeds as follows: (i) a writer w reads from M DS dir to determine the latest timestamp ts (Alg. 1, lines 14-18); (ii) w increments ts and writes hash of value v to M DS hash [ts] (Alg. 1, lines [19] [20] ; (iii) w sends a write message to all data replicas containing (ts, v) and waits for a set Q of t + 1 data replicas to reply (Alg. 1, lines 21-24); (iv) w writes (ts, Q) to M DS dir where Q is a set of t + 1 data replicas that have responded previously (Alg. 1, line [25] [26] ; and (v) w sends a commit message to allow data replicas to garbage collect the data with timestamp less than ts (Alg. 1, lines [27] [28] .
On the other hand, a reader r upon invoking a READ: (i) reads from M DS dir the latest authoritative metadata md with latest timestamp md.ts and a set md.replicas containing ids of t + 1 data replicas that store the latest value (Alg. 1, lines 33-34); and (ii) sends a read message to md.replicas to read timestamp/value pairs not older than md.ts. Since readers do not trust replicas, reader r needs to validate every timestamp/value received in a readVal message sent by a data replica in response to a read message (Alg. 2, lines 55-58). To this end, readers consult the metadata service (Alg. 1, lines 41-51): (i) in case the timestamp received from a data replica ts equals the timestamp in md.ts (Alg. 1, line 43) then the reader only checks, by reading from M DS hash [md.ts], if a corresponding hash of the received value was indeed written by a writer; otherwise, (ii) i.e., when ts > md.ts (Alg. 1, line 45), the reader first validates ts itself by checking if M DS dir points to ts or even a later timestamp, and (if yes) proceeds to check the integrity of the hash by reading from M DS hash [ts ] . TSVals: (TS × {V ∪⊥}) with fields ts and val
4:
TSMeta: (TS × 2 N0 ) ∪ {⊥} with fields ts and replicas 5: Shared objects:
M DS dir , is a MWMR atomic wait-free timestamped storage object storing x ∈ TSMeta
7:
M DS hash [ts ∈ T S] is an array of SWMR safe wait-free storage objects storing x ∈ H(V ) 8: Client state variables: 9: md: TSMeta, initially ⊥
10:
ts: TS, initially (0, ⊥) 
if md = ⊥ then 16: ts ← (0, c)
17:
ts ← md.ts 19: ts ← (ts.num + 1, c) 20 :
Q ← ∅ 22:
send write ts, v to d i
24:
wait until |Q| ≥ t + 1 25: md ← (ts, Q)
26:
M DS dir .TSWRITE(md) 
readval ← (ts, v)
MDStore details
We further explain MDStore using execution ex, depicted in Figure 1 , as an illustration. In ex, we assume t = 1 and hence D = 3 data replicas. In ex, data replica d 1 due to asynchrony does not receive messages in a timely manner, whereas data replica d 3 is Byzantine.
Execution ex starts with a complete wr 1 = WRITE(v 1 ) which stores (ts 1 , v 1 ) into data replicas {d 2 , d 3 }, where ts 1 is a pair (1, w 1 ) that writer w 1 generated in line 19 of wr 1 . Notice that WRITE wr 1 is not explicitly shown in Figure 1 ; however, the states of M DS dir and M DS hash [ts 1 ] upon completion of wr 1 are shown.
In ex, wr 1 is followed by two concurrent operations depicted in Figure 1 : (i) a wr 2 = WRITE(v 2 ) by writer w 2 , and (ii) READ rd by reader r 1 . Upon invoking wr 2 , writer w 2 in Step 1 (we refer to numbers in Fig. 1 if ts > ts ∧ ∃(ts , ·) ∈ data then 65:
ts ← ts 66:
data ← data \ {(ts , ·) ∈ data : ts < ts} timestamp and adds its own id (line 19) to obtain timestamp ts 2 = (2, w 2 ). At the same time, concurrently with wr 2 , reader r 1 invokes READ rd. Reader r 1 first queries M DS dir for metadata md by invoking M DS dir .TSREAD(), to determine the latest timestamp md.ts and the set of data replicas md.replicas that store the latest value (line 34, Step 4 ). M DS dir eventually responds and r 1 sees md.ts = ts 1 and md.replicas = {d 2 , d 3 }. Then, r 1 sends read message to data replicas d 2 and d 3 (lines 37-38, Step 5 ) . By the algorithm, a data replica d replies to a read message with a readVal message containing value associated with its local "authoritative variable ts, which does not necessarily reflect the highest timestamp that replica d stores in data; e.g., in case of d 2 (and d 3 ) in ex, ts equals ts 1 and not ts 2 . However, a Byzantine d 3 could mount a sophisticated attack and respond with the pair (ts 2 , v 2 ) (Step 6 ); although this pair is in fact written concurrently, it is dangerous for r 1 to return v 2 since, in MDStore readers do not writeback data and the value v 2 has not been completely written -this may violate atomicity. To prevent this attack, a reader invokes M DS dir .TSREAD() to determine whether ts 2 (or a higher timestamp) became authoritative in the meantime (lines 45-43, Step 7 ). Since this is not the case, r 1 discards the reply from d 3 and waits for an additional reply (from d 2 ).
An alternative attack by Byzantine d 3 could be to make up a timestamp/value pair with a large timestamp, say ts 100 . In this case, r 1 would also first check with M DS dir whether ts 100 25-26, Step 10 ) when write wr 2 finally "takes effect", i.e., the linearization point of WRITE coincides with the linearization point of the TSWRITE to M DS dir . Finally, the writer sends a commit message to all replicas to allow them to garbage collect stale data (lines 27-28) -notice that data replicas update their local variable ts, that reflects a value they will serve to a reader, only upon receiving a commit message (lines 63-66).
Finally, we point out that MDStore uses timestamped storage (M DS dir ) as a way to avoid storing entire history of a shared variable at data replicas. We could not achieve this with M DS dir being a classical storage object, since such a classical storage object would allow overwrites of M DS dir with a lower timestamp. With our protocol at data replicas (notably lines 59-62) and our goal of not storing entire histories, such an overwrite could put M DS dir in inconsistent state with data replicas.
Metadata service implementations
It is straightforward to implement MDStore metadata service reusing existing asynchronous BFT storage implementations that rely on 3t + 1 replicas -in our case these are exactly 3t M + 1 metadata replicas. To qualify for reuse, existing BFT protocols should also tolerate an arbitrary number of Byzantine readers, any number of crash-faulty writers, and, ideally, make no cryptographic assumptions.
First, it is critical to see that M DS dir , our MWMR atomic wait-free timestamped storage, can be implemented as a straightforward extension of the classical SWMR to MWMR atomic storage object transformation (see e.g., [4] , page 163). In this transformation, there is one SWMR storage object per writer and writers store timestamp/value pairs in "their" storage object, after first reading and incrementing the highest timestamp found in any other storage object. In this extension, the reader determines the timestamp/value pair with the highest timestamp among the SWMR storage objects as usual, and simply returns also the timestamp together with the value.
As a building block for this implementation, one can then use existing SWMR atomic wait-free storage (with 3t + 1 replicas); examples include [2, 12, 14] (no cryptographic assumptions) and [25] (digital signatures). On the other hand, for M DS hash , which is an array of SWMR safe storage objects, one can directly use the protocols with atomic semantics mentioned above, or even weaker implementations, such as (i) SWMR safe wait-free storage [1] , (ii) its regular variant without cryptographic assumptions [13] , or (iii) regular storage with digital signatures [24] .
Finally, we claim that much more efficient, direct, implementations of the MDStore metadata service are possible and relatively simple to achieve. These are beyond the scope of this paper, however.
Lower bounds
In this section we prove two lower bounds: (1) we show that using 2t + 1 data replicas to tolerate t data replica crash faults is necessary for any single-writer single-reader obstruction-free safe storage, even with the help of a metadata service oracle; and (2) we also show that the same result extends to 3t + 1 data replicas in the Byzantine data replica fault model. However, this second lower bound applies in the model with an unbounded adversary. The lower bound does not hold as soon as we assume a bounded adversary who cannot subvert collision-resistant cryptographic hash functions (see also Sec. 2).
Technically, we unify the two results into a single lower bound proof in the hybrid failure model where we consider D = 2t + b + 1 data replicas out of which up to b can be Byzantine and up to t − b can only crash. For the purpose of the lower bound proof, we focus on the model with a single writer.
Preliminaries. Our lower bound model assumes a metadata service (Def. 4.1): in short, a metadata service is an oracle, modeled as a correct process that never fails. 5 A metadata service is parameterized by the domain of values V of the implemented storage. Roughly speaking, a metadata service can implement an arbitrary functionality, except that it might not be able to help a reader distinguish whether the writer wrote value v ∈ V or value v ∈ V , where v = v .
Definition 4.1 (Metadata service)
A metadata service for a value domain V (denoted by MDS V ) is a correct process that can implement an arbitrary automaton with the following limitation. There exist two values v, v ∈ V (we say indistinguishable to MDS V ), such that there is no distributed storage algorithm that involves MDS V , the writer and a set of processes P , such that some process p ∈ P can distinguish execution ex v from ex v , where:
• In ex v , the writer invokes a complete WRITE(v) and crashes, such that no process in P receives any message from the writer in ex v , and
• In ex v , the writer invokes a complete WRITE(v ) and crashes, such that no process in P receives any message from the writer in ex v .
Intuitively, Definition 4.1 models metadata service (rather generally) as an oracle with an arbitrary functionality that cannot, however, be used to store (or forward/proxy) data. Observe that, if we extend both executions ex v and ex v in Definition 4.1 by appending a READ by a correct reader (from P ), to obtain partial executions ex v and ex v (respectively), obstruction-freedom or safety must be violated in at least one of ex v and ex v .
To state our lower bound precisely, we modify our model of Section 2 to assume that, out of D data replicas, up to b can be Byzantine and additional t − b may crash. We assume 0 ≤ b ≤ t.
We assume an unbounded adversary (Sec. 2), that can coordinate Byzantine processes and that either knows values v and v that are indistinguishable to MDS V , or can compute v given v , or vice-versa.
We can now state the main result of this section:
Theorem 4.2 There is no asynchronous implementation I of a single-writer single-reader (SWSR) obstructionfree safe storage (with domain V ), with D ≤ 2t + b data replicas and a metadata service for V .
We first prove Theorem 4.2 and then briefly discuss the scope of Theorem 4.2 in context of weaker (yet realistic) adversaries.
Proof: Assume by contradiction that Theorem 4.2 does not hold and that implementation I exists. We develop a series of executions of I in which we use standard indistinguishability arguments to show that at most 2t + b data replicas do not help the reader tell the difference between values indistinguishable to MDS V , v and v . To this end, we divide the set of data replicas in three disjoint groups T 1 and T 2 each containing at most t data replicas, and group B containing at most b data replicas.
Consider first partial execution ex 1 in which replicas from group T 1 crash at the beginning of ex 1 and the writer invokes WRITE(v). By obstruction-freedom wr 1 eventually completes. Then, the writer crashes and ex 1 ends at time t 1 , such that the messages sent by the writer to the reader and data replicas from T 1 are not delivered. We denote the state of data replicas from group B at t 1 by σ v .
Let ex 2 be a partial execution in which the writer invokes WRITE(v ) that ends at time t 2 , such that ex 2 is otherwise identical to ex 1 . We denote the state of data replicas from group B at t 2 by σ v .
Let ex 1 be a partial execution similar to ex 1 , except that data replicas from T 1 do not crash, yet they still do not receive any message by time t 1 (due to asynchrony). At time t 1 , data replicas from T 2 crash. This is followed by READ rd 1 by the reader at t 3 > max{t 1 , t 2 }. The reader and data replicas in T 1 , never receive any message from faulty data replicas from T 2 or the faulty writer. By obstruction-freedom rd 1 eventually completes (at t 4 ) and, by safety, returns value written by wr 1 , i.e., v.
Let ex 2 be a partial execution similar to ex 2 , except that replicas from T 1 are not faulty, yet they still do not receive any message by time t 2 (due to asynchrony). At time t 2 , data replicas from B (if any) exhibit a Byzantine fault, by changing their state from σ v to σ v (see ex 1 ). After this, data replicas from B follow the protocol. This is followed by a READ rd 2 by the reader at t 3 . Moreover, assume that due to asynchrony, MDS V , the reader and data replicas in T 1 , do not receive any message from data replicas from T 2 until after t 4 . Notice that, by Definition 4.1 and since they do not receive any message from the writer or data replicas in T 2 , the reader and the data replicas in T 1 cannot distinguish ex 2 from ex 1 . Hence, in ex 2 , rd 2 returns v (at t 4 ) like in ex 1 . However, this violates safety by which rd 2 must return v . A contradiction.
Discussion. We make two observations about Theorem 4.2. First, in the crash model, where b = 0, Theorem 4.2 implies that 2t+1 data replicas are necessary for implementing SWSR obstruction-free safe storage, even with a metadata service oracle. Second, notice that the Byzantine "part" of the proof critically relies on the ability of the adversary to successfully switch from the state where Byzantine replicas "observed" v to the state where Byzantine replicas seemingly have "observed" v (see ex 2 ). In practice this can be easily prevented using collision resistant cryptographic hash functions. In this case, our lower bound proof and Theorem 4.2 do not apply for b > 0. Implementations in models with such a bounded (yet very realistic) adversary, are only subject to the 2t + 1 lower bound from the crash model. We demonstrated one such implementation with our MDStore protocol in Section 3.
Related Work
The read/write storage abstraction (also known as a register) was formalized by Lamport [19] . This work also defines three classical register consistency semantics: safe, regular and atomic. Since then, numerous papers have dealt with fault-tolerant register implementations where a set of storage replicas implements a register, accessed by set of fault-prone clients.
In this context, Martin et al. [26] demonstrated a tight 3t + 1 lower bound on the number of replicas in any register implementation to tolerate t Byzantine replicas in an asynchronous system. The bound of [26] was shown to apply even to single-writer single-reader safe register, where the reader and the writer are benign, i.e., crash-prone. In this paper, we refine this bound, by (logically) separating storage replicas into data replicas and metadata replicas. With such a separation, we show that the 3t + 1 lower bound of [26] applies to register metadata replicas only, but it does not hold for the number of data replicas: only 2t + 1 data replicas are needed to tolerate t Byzantine data replicas.
While our separation of data from metadata is novel in the context of asynchronous Byzantine faulttolerant (BFT) storage, it has already been employed in asynchronous crash-tolerant storage [6, 10] and its state-machine replication-based variants [30] . Interestingly, separation of data from metadata does not reap benefits in terms of reduced resource costs with crash-faults: indeed all of the mentioned crash-tolerant protocols that exercise data/metadata separation [6, 10, 30] still need 2t + 1 data replicas. We show that this is inherent by demonstrating that even with a trusted, fault-free metadata service, 2t + 1 data replicas are necessary to tolerate t data replica faults.
The concept of separation of data from control planes is well-known in consensus and state machine replication. Lamport's Paxos algorithms [20, 21] introduced the separation of consensus roles into proposers, acceptors, and learners. Roughly, with this separation, proposers propose consensus values (i.e., data), acceptors handle consensus control information (i.e., agreement metadata), whereas learners learn data (i.e., a consensus decision). Consensus role separation has been exercised in partially synchronous BFT consensus protocols, where the 3t + 1 resilience lower bound was shown to apply only to acceptors [22] , but not to proposers or learners. For example, [14] demonstrated a partially synchronous BFT consensus protocol in which any number of proposers and learners can be Byzantine.
Intuitively, in BFT consensus any number of learners can be Byzantine since consensus learners are "passive", i.e., they simply learn values and are never polled. This is different in state machine replication, where the role of learners is played by servers maintaining application replicas that need to execute and serve clients' requests. In the context of state machine replication, Yin et al. [31] apply the ideas from Lamport's consensus role separation and separate agreement from execution to obtain protocols with resilience bounds that are similar to ours, with 3t + 1 agreement replicas and 2t + 1 execution replicas. Here, it is important to see a fundamental difference between our result and the results of [14, 31] that apply to state-machine replication and consensus. Indeed, all consensus and state-machine replication protocols are, unlike our asynchronous storage, subject to the FLP impossibility result [11] , and are hence forced to make stronger timing assumptions [9] .
Conclusion and Future Work
This paper presents MDStore, the first asynchronous BFT storage protocol that uses 2t + 1 data replicas to tolerate t Byzantine faults in a general model without trusted components. To achieve this, MDStore separates data from metadata and relies on collision-resistant cryptographic hash functions which we show inherent. In this paper we show also that, perhaps surprisingly, no crash-tolerant storage implementation can achieve better resilience with respect to data replicas than our BFT MDStore. In addition, MDStore implements strong guarantees such as wait-freedom and atomicity (linearizability). Finally, the MDStore metadata service can be implemented using existing BFT storage protocols that need 3t + 1 replicas to tolerate t Byzantine faults.
Our work opens more avenues for future work. We show that with the design that separates data and metadata, the cost of BFT storage, traditionally a major impediment to its practical deployment, is on par with that of crash tolerant storage. For BFT storage this is a paradigm shift since it requires rethinking all the aspects of BFT storage including complexity, erasure coding techniques and practical implications, all of which have been extensively studied in the traditional "unified" model of data and metadata.
A MDStore Correctness
In this section we prove that the pseudocode in Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 is correct by showing that it satisfies atomicity and wait-freedom. Lemma A.2 (Timestamped Storage Safety) Let x be a timestamped storage object and let tsrd be an operation x.TSREAD returning (ts , v ). If tsrd follows after an operation x.TSWRITE((ts, v)) or after an operation x.TSREAD returning (ts, v), then ts ≥ ts.
Proof: Follows from the sequential specification of timestamped storage.
Lemma A.3 (Sandwich) Let rd be a complete READ operation and let md and md be the value returned by M DS dir in lines 34 and 46 respectively, Then md.ts ≤ ts(rd) ≤ md .ts.
Proof: By Definition A.1, ts(rd) is readval.ts when the assignment in line 51 completes. For this to happen, either the condition in line 43 or line 45 must be satisfied. This is implies that either ts(rd) = md.ts or md.ts < ts(rd) ≤ md .ts. Lemma A.6 (Integrity) Let rd be a READ operation with timestamp ts(rd) returning value v = ⊥. Then there is a single WRITE operation wr of the form WRITE(v) such that ts(rd) = ts(wr).
Proof: Since rd returns v and has an associated timestamp ts(rd), rd receives (ts(rd), v) from one of the data replicas. Suppose for the purpose of contradiction that v is never written. Then, then by the collision resistance of H, the check in line 50 does not pass and rd does not return v. Therefore, we conclude that some operation wr sends a message write ts(rd), v in line 23. Since ts(wr) is set only once during the execution of a WRITE and that occurs in line 19, it follows that ts(wr) = ts(rd). Finally, by Lemma A.5 no other write has the same timestamp, which completes the proof.
Theorem A.7 (Atomicity (Linearizability)) Every execution ex of Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 satisfies atomicity.
Proof: Let ex be an execution of the algorithm. By Lemma A.6 the timestamp of a READ operation either has been written by some WRITE operation or the READ returns ⊥.
We first construct ex from ex by completing all WRITE operations of the form WRITE(v), where v has been returned by some complete READ operation. Then we construct a sequential permutation π by ordering all operations in ex excluding the READ operations that did return ⊥ according to their timestamps and by placing all READ operations that did not return ⊥ immediately after the WRITE operation with the same timestamp. The READ operations that did return ⊥ are placed in the beginning of π. Note that concurrent READ operations with the same timestamp may appear in any order, whereas all other READ operations appear in the same order as in ex .
To prove that π preserves the sequential specification of a MWMR register we must show that a READ always returns the value written by the latest preceding write which appears before it in π, or the initial value of the register ⊥ if there is no preceding write in π. Let rd be a READ operation returning a value v. If v = ⊥, then by construction rd is ordered before any WRITE in π.
Otherwise, v = ⊥ and by Lemma A.6 there exists a WRITE(v) operation, with the same timestamp, ts(rd). In this case, this write is placed in π before rd, by construction. By Lemma A.5, other write operations in π have a different associated timestamp and therefore appear in π either before WRITE(v) Proof: Since the shared storage objects used in Algorithm 1 are wait-free, every READ or WRITE operation invoked on M DS dir and M DS hash [ts] , where ts ∈ T SV als, eventually completes. It remains to show that no WRITE (resp. READ) operation blocks in line 24 (resp. 39). For a WRITE operation wr, the waiting condition in line 24 is eventually satisfied because there is a time after which all correct data replicas reply and there are at least t + 1 such replicas. On the other hand, let rd be a READ operation and suppose for the purpose of contradiction that the waiting condition in line 39 is never satisfied, and therefore readval is never set in line 51. Let d i be a correct data replica such that i ∈ md.replicas. Since rd did previously sent a read md.ts message to d i , eventually rd receives a reply from d i consisting of a pair (ts , v) in line 41.
If ts satisfies md.ts ≤ ts ≤ md .ts, then since d i is a correct replica, the condition in line 50 is also satisfied, and therefore readval is set in line 51. Suppose for the purpose of contradiction that ts < md.ts or ts > md .ts. Notice that the requested timestamp is md.ts. If ts < md.ts then d i replied with a smaller timestamp than md.ts. However, notice that according to the check in the replica code in line 56, d i never replies with a timestamp smaller than the requested timestamp, contradicting our assumption. Otherwise, if ts > md .ts, then by Lemma A.3 ts > md.ts, and therefore d i replies with its local timestamp ts. According to the replica code, line 65 is the only place where ts is changed. Furthermore, if ts changes to ts(wr ) then wr is a WRITE operation that committed. According to the WRITE code, wr commits only after writing ts(wr ) to M DS dir . Hence, if ts > md .ts, then rd invokes M DS dir in line 46 and does so only after the corresponding WRITE wrote ts to M DS dir . By Lemma A.2, M DS dir returns in line 46 a value whose timestamp is a least ts , which means that md .ts ≥ ts , a contradiction.
